ΕΝ ΕΦΕΣΩ

Dan Wallace has posted a very short essay that simply surveys the major interpretive landscape of 1 Timothy 2:12. He doesn’t give much in terms of conclusions about what his view is. In general that’s very helpful considering that most discussions of this verse are so emotionally charged toward one perspective that it can be hard for people to understand exactly how many complex and unsure issues there are.

And by the way, I can think of probably another half dozen that didn’t make his list.

Interpretive Issues in 1 Timothy 2:12

For sometime, I’ve been an advocate for people who do not know the original languages (& probably never will) to learn how to meaningfully look at and compare differences of translation, paragraphing, & formatting in using multiple translations rather than simply using a “literal” translation.

But it has been only recently that I’ve realized that many people don’t think such a thing is possible.

And so, I’ve created a poll here to see what you, my readers, think on this issue. I’d also be interested in your comments as well.

I’m particularly interested in the thoughts of those whose answers are based on experience in both practices — if such people exist, but everyone’s thoughts on this question are definitely welcome & encouraged.

The Gender Blog has written a post on some “rules of engagement” that they think every Christian should follow:

1. If I find something with which I cannot agree, I am wrong.
2. If I find something which I cannot understand, I am wrong to judge it on that account. Here Lyons gives an unforgettable quote from the great D.M. Lloyd-Jones: “You have a very small brain and you have a very poor spirit within you; do not be surprised that you cannot understand.”
3. If I find something which would contradict the clear teaching of Scripture elsewhere, I cannot be right.
4. If I find something which would slander the revealed character of God, I am certainly wrong.
5. If I find something which brings up an apparent contradiction, I am wrong not to face it squarely.
6. If I find something which leads to a summary principle, I am wrong if I do not follow it to its conclusion.
7. If I find something which disturbs my settled convictions, I am wrong to dismiss it on that account.
8. If I find something which calls for decisive action and I remain inert, I am fatally wrong.
9. If I find something which I dare not follow in its practical drift, I am destructively wrong.
10. If I find something which others blush to admit or struggle to avoid, I am unwise to follow them at that point. A great quote from Calvin: “The delicacy of those who affect an appearance of greater prudence than the Holy Spirit in removing or resolving difficulties, is quite intolerable.”
11. If I find something upon which popular religion frowns, I may presume I am on the right track. C.H. Spurgeon famously said, “Be assured there is nothing new in theology except that which is false.”
12. If I find something which would tend to humble man and glorify God, I am most probably right.

Unfortunately, they’ve forgotten rule 13, which everyone already does follow (unfortunately without awareness typically):

13. If I find a text in scripture that doesn’t fit with another text of scripture then I go with the one I like and explain away the other.

We like to pretend that we don’t do this. But we do it all the time – both Complementarians, Egalitarians, and every other theological debate. The irony is that when both sides follow #13 – and they typically do, they accidentally break #5.*

There’s a tension that we don’t like between Galatians 3:28 and passages like 1 Cor 14:34-35 that both side pretend (often unknowingly) doesn’t exist.

* To be honest, I also find these twelve rules overly simplistic and almost naive as if we can understand and interpret scripture so obnoxiously mechanically (e.g. on #6, what one person calls a “summary principle,” another person may very well call bad exegesis).

Few know that my brother blogs, mainly because he doesn’t blog often and doesn’t participate in this very strange community that is the blogosphere.

His recent post on hermeneutics in Biblical Interpretation and law interpretation is definitely worth reading:

Hermeneutics: Cross Streets for Law & Theology

God an author! – The inspiration of this Book is as much a grand humiliation and condescension of God as was the act of creation by the Father and the incarnation of the Son. Owing to this fact, humility of heart is the single dispositional condition inherent to rightly reading the Bible and is the sole indispensable trait of mind required in preparing to do so.

-Johann Georg Hamann, trans. Dr. Michael McDuffee

Reading John Hobbin’s recent post and the post at Compligalitarian, I must say that I don’t care for “plain sense” arguments. Appeals to the plain sense of scripture tend to either ignore or deny that what was the plain sense of a text for the original audience is not necessarily applicable to us today.

Appeals to the plain sense of scripture tend to forget that when it comes to Paul’s letters, we are literally reading other people’s mail. And thus any commands in Paul’s letters do not directly map to the modern day. If we are going to describe our faith as being a faith grounded in history, we must take that history seriously when interpreting historical and contextual texts such as Paul’s letters.

We treat Paul’s letters like a handbook for our lives today rather than historically conditioned, occassional texts, written for a specific purpose or need. We find it easy to ignore commands to Euodia and Syntyche in Philippians 4:2 because their names are explicitly mentioned. But we fail to recognize that all of Paul’s letters are just as specific and occassional as that single command in Philippians 4:2.

So if we’re going to appeal to the plain sense of scripture in our interpretation, we must first recognize that the plain sense is not necessarily directly applicable to the 21st century and in fact there’s often no reason to assume that the plain sense was applicable to anyone beyond the immediate situation Paul is addressing. Going back to Euodia and Syntyche, the plain sense of Paul’s command is applicable only directly to those two people. Of course there are theological implications, but those are separate from the command itself. The vast majority of commands in 1 Corinthians or 1 Timothy are only directly applicable to the the Corinthians or Timothy’s immediate situation. And for that reason, we’re safer building application from Paul’s statements about theology than on his commands to the original audience.

And it is for that reason that if I were to become a complimentarian again, I would have to be convinced by statements other than the commands of 1 Timothy 2:12.

The Speculative Grammarian is probably my favorite linguistic journal in existence. In their most recent issue, they have a delightful article that can and should be applied to not only linguistics, but also to Biblical scholars and theologians or [Insert Discipline HERE] as well.

‘The Symptoms and Warning Signs of Framework Psychosis’
By Dr. Pill, M.D.

“Framework Psychosis, a new and dangerous affliction sweeping through academia like wildfire, is the unhealthy (and unfounded) belief that one’s framework, whatever it may be, is the one true framework. As a public service, I have written up a set of guidelines that will allow concerned individuals to identify those suffering from Framework Psychosis. If you are an academic, I encourage you to post this list in your lounges, labs, lecture halls, and latrines. With your help, we may yet be able to eradicate FP in our lifetime.”

Since I don’t have a lab or a lounge, I’m posting the list on my blog (the various article links are also from SpecGram):

• There is no such thing as a framework free of complications. If you believe you subscribe to one, you may be a Framework Psychotic. (Cf. Greenberg, Merritt and Joseph Ruhlen. (2006). “The Language of Prehistory”.)
• A Framework Psychotic believes that their framework can (or will eventually be able to) explain everything, and is puzzled or disturbed by those who question that fact. (Cf. Bernini, Gianlorenzo. (1990). “Moving Greek Letters”.)
• Framework Psychotics do not suffer dissent. Those who disagree with their framework are seen either as foolish, or as enemies—or both. (Cf. Neuerblumenfeld, Gotthilf. (1998). “Multiple Choice: The Ultimate Algorithm”.)
• In the end, a Framework Psychotic will spend more time ridiculing or attempting to disprove the theories of others than doing any original research—or anything else, for that matter. (Cf. Papalopogous, Andreas. (1990). “The Priority of Written Language”.)
• A Framework Psychotic will gradually begin to apply their framework to everything, including those things that lie outside of the framework’s intended area of applicability. (Cf. Pulju, Tim. (1988). “A Stratificational Approach to Making Macaroni and Cheese”.)
• When writing about or discussing their field, Framework Psychotics, at first, find it simpler to discuss things in terms of their framework, as opposed to other frameworks or in general terms. After a while, Framework Psychotics find it difficult to write about or discuss their field in terms of anything other than their framework. In the final stage, Framework Psychotics find it impossible to write about or discuss their field in terms of anything other than their framework, and most likely will not be able to understand what the problem is if it’s pointed out to them. (Cf. Goff, Ed. (1991). “On the indexico-relational inductivity hypothesis of proto-flectional meta-syntagm residuals in the discourse-evaluative elicitation of interactionally non-null quasi-specifiability criteria for quantificational irreducibility quotients in satisficing algorithms for preliminary displacement reduction of grammatological abductive derivational extrapolation heuristics factors considerations: A re-evaluation.”.)
• Regarding jargon, a Framework Psychotic will begin to weave the language of their framework into their natural speech about every area of life, not just their own field of study. (Cf. the 2004 announcement, “Further Evidence for Language as a Virus from Space: A Symposium in Two Movements”.)
• Every framework will encounter counterexamples or challenges. In the beginning, the Framework Psychotic will listen to objections, and attempt to explain them in terms of their framework, believing those who’ve raised objections have merely misunderstood the intricacies of the framework. At a later stage, the Framework Psychotic will become greatly disturbed by challenges, and will take them (and respond to them) as personal attacks. In the final stage of Framework Psychosis, the afflicted will cease to recognize counterexamples and challenges, valid or otherwise. (Cf. Tirizdi. (2006). “On the Necessity of a Tri-Branching Corpse”.)
• Before long, the friends of a Framework Psychotic become enemies. No one understands a given framework the way a Framework Psychotic does—not even another Framework Psychotic who subscribes to the same framework. Two Framework Psychotics will possess different understandings of their framework, and any difference between the two understandings, no matter how minute, will be magnified in the eyes of a Framework Psychotic. Instead of a compatriot with a different understanding of a detail, the Framework Psychotic sees their former friend as an enemy posing as a friend, or a traitor—a heretic. They, then, like true enemies, will be shunned, and despised. (Cf. Snodgrass, Quentin P. (2007). “The Lexicalist Agenda: Exposing the Myths”.)
• A Framework Psychotic has been lost irrevocably when they can no longer see or experience anything save their framework. (Cf. Pill, D. (2008). “The Symptoms and Warning Signs of Framework Psychosis”.)

At this stage, human beings cease to be human, and instead become elements of a grand framework that explains everything, including existence itself. For the rest of us, it’s best to simply avoid the afflicted. They may seem lifelike, and may still eat and breathe, but, rest assured, they are no longer humans: they are nothing more than theoretical constructs living out a theoretical existence.

This is Part III of a four part series discussing my view of Stanley Port’er work on Verbal Aspect in Greek. The following are my four posts. The focus on this discussion will be point three. The following are my four points (which are also here with a little more information):

1. His thesis that Greek verbs are not temporal is far from being as extreme and as revolutionary as many think (probably including Porter).
2. If Porter had formed and articulated his thesis in a different manner, more people would have accepted it.
3. I think Porter’s major monograph is incredibly inconsistent in its use of terminology such as Aspect and Aktionsart.
4. I think that he’s wrong about the aspectaul vagueness of the “Future tense-form.” It should be viewed as Perfective.

What does this mean? It basically means that 1) while there is more to be said for old grammars than Porter appears to suggest, 2) there is also still much to do and 3) Koine Greek linguistic studies still must get past Comparative Philology as its linguistic model while also recognizing its important contributions. Porter and Moulton have much in common, particularly that they are/were both linguists. 100 years ago, nearly everyone who wrote Greek grammar had studied linguistics we need to get back to that point today. Not all the questions have been answered and some of them need to be asked again.

What follows is an elaboration of point #3 (my discussion of points 1-2 is HERE and Part IV’s discussion of point #4, see HERE).

Point #3

I discussed this a bit already in my discussion of verbal aspect from my review of MHT, but I thought I should say something more and actually document exactly what I’m talking about. I argued previously that what Porter missed was that Aktionsart for the the early twentieth century linguistics (including Moulton) was the very same thing as Aspect. Often times its difficult to see whether he’s aware of this or not. He writes,

Determining Aktionsart is an attempt to define objectively the kind of action conveyed by the verb. Therefore such terms as punctual iterative, terminative, cursive, perfective, linear, are used (Porter, 33).

But other than this assertion, he gives no evidence that this was actually the case for the old grammarians. And when we read the actual grammars, its hard to see how it could be the case. I’d like to show you the discussions of two other Greek scholars and Porter’s comments about them.

Robertson’s Big Grammar

Since we already discussed Moulton back in my review of his grammar, we’ll first examine A. T. Robertson instead. Regarding aktionsart, he writes:

There were originally two verb-types, the one denoting durative or linear action, the other momentary or punctiliar action. Hence some verbs have two roots, one linear (durative), like φέρω (fero), the other punctiliar (momentary), like ἤνεγκον (tuli). So ὁράω, εἶδον; τολμάω, ἔτλην. With other verbs the distinction was not drawn sharply, the root could be used either way (cf. φη-μί, ἔ-φη-ν; λέγ-ω, ἔ-λεγ-ο-ν) (Robertson, 823).

On the one hand Robertson’s use of language such as “denote” when discussing aktionsart might suggestion that he is definitely thinking only of “objective action.” But what suggests to me otherwise is that in the very same paragraph he writes, “the root could be used either way.” There are a couple key words in that little clause. One of them is “could,” which definitely denotes potentiality rather than objective reality. The other key word is “used” “The root could be used” in either a punctiliar/perfective or a linear/imperfective manner. Now that sounds a whole lot like its the author’s choice as to how a give root is used, which is exactly what Porter’s definition of aspect says:

Greek verbal aspect is a synthetic semantic category … used …  grammaticalize the author’s reasoned subjective choice (Porter 88; my italics).

But going back to Robertson, if its the author’s choice about how a root can be used, then its not a matter of objective “kind of action.” I might suggest that much of the problem (and much of the “abuse of the aorist,” to borrow Stagg’s phrase) is a direct result of interpreting literally technical terminology. That is to say, the German word aktionsart, while it does mean “kind of action,” was a technical term in 1900’s grammar and linguistics. And thus, the fact that the literal definition suggests a sort of “objective action” does not require it to be used in such a way – even when a grammarian provides the literal translation as both Moulton and Robertson did.

But that is also not to say that they didn’t use it that way, in the same quotation from Robertson above, it is clear that Robertson uses the term aktionsart to refer to lexical aspect as well. This is where Silva’s perspective referenced in my review of MHT come into play. Thus, rather clearly in my opinion, the older early twentieth century grammarians got it right on verbal aspect in a number of ways. They aren’t perfect, but they’re not as wrong as Porter appears to suggest.

C. F. D. Moule & his Idiom Book of New Testament Greek:

This leads me to C. F. D. Moule. Porter is relatively favorable in discussing him because of Moule’s definitions are much more obviously in line with his own perspective. But even still Porter misses what is probably the clearest evidence that aktionsart and aspect have been used to refer to the same thing–Or more precisely, that aktionsart has been used both in the way Porter usese it (lexical aspect) and also in the way he uses the term aspect. Porter writes,

Moule defines “kind of action” as a morphologically-based category wihch captures the writer’s conception of the action…. Unfortunately, he labels this Aktionsart (not aspect) and lists three Aktionsarten: linear, punctiliar, and perfect (Porter, 58).

And if we actually pick up and read Moule’s discussion, we see that Porter either missed or did not consider it as necessary to mention Moule’s additional notes (added in the back of the second edition) to Moule’s discussion where he says,

“See the valuable criticism of this term [Aktionsart], in favor of aspect, by J. P. Smith in Verbum Domini, XXXIII (1955), 54f” (Moule, 202).

Simply put, if Moule had writtn the first edition of his grammar after 1955, he more than likely would have used the term aspect rather than aktionsart.

But Moule’s extended discussion also deserves some discussion, a discussion that put the nail in the coffin in my opinion. This is because Moule used the word “Aktionsart” with a clearly aspectual definition, more clearly than Robertson did.

… [A]nother consideration appears to have presented itself first–namely the nature of the event, or … the Aktionsart. Generally speaking, the first question that the Greek writer seems to ask himself is not ‘When did (or will) this happen?’ but ‘Am I conceiving of it as protracted or as virtually instantaneous?’ (Moule, 5 my emphasis in bold).

Moule’s perspective is essential and significant, especially because he began his study of Greek at a very early age. Anyone whose uncle was the Bishop of Durham, H.C.G Moule, would be expected to study the Greek rather early. He won a classical scholarship to Cambridge in 1927 (at the age of 19) and then “securing Firsts in both parts of the Classical Tripos and winning the Jeremie Septuagint and Evans prizes and the Crosse scholarship.” Because his study of Greek goes back to the peak of the comparative philology that formed a basis for both Moulton and Robertson’s grammars, the fact that he defines aktionsart in essentially the same way Porter defines aspect is highly important.

But could it simply be that Moule’s view of aktionsart developed and changed between the 1920’s and when his Idiom Book was first published in in 1953? This is highly unlikely for a couple reasons. For one,  if his view of the verb changed from an objective expression of action to the subjective choice of the author in the intervening years, it must then be asked why he continued to use the term aktionsart. Using the same term would only confuse his readers. But even more important is the fact that in the same paragraph and very next sentence after he gives his definition of aktionsart as the author’s conception of action, he quotes Moulton’s Prolegomena approvingly.

Moulton has represented this pictorially by popularizing the terms ‘linear’ and ‘punctiliar’ to denote the two chief contrasted types of action–protracted like a line and focused into a point.

These words suggests that Moule believed that Moulton considered aktionsart to be the that same author’s subjective choice. And on the basis of my discussions above of Robertson and Moulton in my review, it seems only right that we should give Moulton that same reading Moule did.

Conclusions:

I have attempted in the above paragraphs, by means of textual and historical evidence, to show that at the beginning of the twentieth century, the term aktionsart was used to refer to both lexical and morphological aspect. This fact is Porter’s chief failing in his historical discussion of aktionsart and aspect studies as he surveys the grammars of past centuries. But it is not only Porter’s failing. Its everyone’s. I mentioned in pasing Stagg’s article on the Aorist and its abuse by many exegetes. The aorist’s abuse was also a result of this failing. As NT students and scholars of NT Greek lost connection with the rest of the Linguistic world because of the false assumption by many that there was nothing else to be done missunderstanding of terminology and description arose.

The main point to take away from all of this discussion is that the old grammars should still be used and read. They are still incredibly valuable with many years of language study behind them. But they should also be read in their own historical context, especially when it comes to special and technical terminology. Only then will we understand them as they intended.

Judy at her research blog, has written a very nice anecdote with hermeneutical implications. I’d suggest you go check it out.

Also, because of David Ker’s past comments about the crisis in Zimbabwe, I’ve been following the story in the New York Times. Yesterday’s headline caught my attention – both because of its content – its definitely worth the read for its own sake.

But also the headline itself is a perfect example of semantic ambiguity upon which linguistic humor thrives!

Zimbabwe Arms Shipped by China Spark an Uproar

Regardless of how your interpret the sentence, you can definitely understand why that would cause an uproar.

Personally, I’m suspicious that Headline writers intentionally create lines like this one.

What kind of arms exactly are we talking about here?

I scored a 65 on The Hermeneutics Quiz. I beat my wife by two points. For those of you who struggle with math, that’s a 63.

I didn’t like some of the questions, probably the same ones that surprised Peter Kirk.

I was also almost progressive, though not as progressive as Chris.